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The determinants of sovereign spreads in emerging markets 
 
Abstract 
This study analyzes both short-run and long-run determinants of the 
sovereign spreads in a set of 21 emerging countries over the period 1998-2004 
utilizing both daily and monthly data and estimate individual country and panel 
regressions. Our analysis shows that both domestic and international factors affect 
spreads, where the most important common determinant of the spreads is found to 
be the risk appetite of foreign investors. By using an event study methodology we 
find no evidence of impact of the FOMC announcements on spreads. Finally, we 
analyze whether news regarding domestic politics and announcements of 
international organizations play a role in the evolution of spreads. Using the post-
crisis data of Turkey, we point out an important effect of such news releases. 
 
JEL classification: E43; E58; F36; G14; G15  
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to identify the determinants of the emerging market bond 
index (EMBI)
1 spreads of a set of emerging countries. A standard measure of 
default risk of an emerging country is that country’s component of the EMBI 
spread, which is the difference between the yield on emerging country sovereign 
bonds and the yield on bonds issued by a government of the industrialized world 
with identical currency denomination and maturity. Favero and Giavazzi (2004) 
showed that, in Brazil, important financial variables, like exchange rates and 
domestic interest rates, fluctuated parallel to the EMBI spread over the period 
1999-2003. Özatay (2005) documented similar evidence for Turkey for the 2001 – 
2004 post-crisis period. Blanchard (2004) estimated the probability of default of 
the Brazilian government by using EMBI spread data. He showed that the EMBI 
spread and the probability of default moved together over the 1995-2003 period. 
These observations show that understanding the underlying factors 
determining EMBI spreads is not only important for international investors but also 
for economic policy-makers of emerging markets. If the main determinants of these 
spreads are macroeconomic fundamentals, then this will be good news for 
countries that have a bad track record but started to implement good policies. After 
all, as the implementation of sound policies continues, default risk will eventually 
diminish and converge to zero. However, the extent to which international risk 
factors such as changes in interest rates in the developed world have a great impact 
on spreads means that these countries can find themselves in serious trouble: they 
can be penalized when they are just doing the “right”. A significant increase in  4  
 
EMBI spreads (default risk) due to a tightening cycle in industrial countries, could 
lead to a rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio by depreciating the domestic currency and 
raising domestic interest rates, which has the potential to ignite a self-fulfilling 
prophecy as in the second generation crisis models. Moreover, based on positive 
correlations between domestic interest rates, exchange rates, and spreads, Favero 
and Giavazzi (2004) and Blanchard (2004) emphasized potential problems that 
inflation targeting countries could face in case of an upward trend in spreads 
followed by depreciation pressures on domestic currencies and deterioration in 
inflation expectations leading to a rise in inflationary pressures. If the debt to GDP 
ratio is an important determinant of spreads then a central bank that raises its policy 
rate to contain such inflationary pressures will find itself in deep trouble, simply 
because a rise in policy rates will undermine debt sustainability, especially when 
the average maturity of the debt is short. 
What are the determinants of EMBI spreads? Earlier empirical literature 
has not been conclusive on the relative importance of macroeconomic 
fundamentals with respect to international risk factors on determining EMBI 
spreads. For instance, Cline and Barnes (1997) found the statistically insignificant 
effect of US interest rates on new-issue bond spreads (so-called launch spreads) of 
eleven emerging market countries for the period 1992-1996. Kamin and von Kleist 
(1999) reported that for almost 300 new-issue bond spreads over the 1991 – 1997 
period, domestic macroeconomic fundamentals -as reflected by sovereign credit 
ratings- had played an important role in determining spreads. However, they could 
not identify any robust and statistically significant relationship between industrial  5  
 
country interest rates and new-issue bond spreads. Eichengreen and Mody (1998) 
emphasized the fact that, for launch spreads, it is important to distinguish supply 
and demand effects of changes in international interest rates. They analyzed more 
than 1500 new-issue bond spreads between 1991 and 1996 and reported that, once 
controlled for negative impact of US interest rates on the decision of developing-
country borrowers to issue debt, a rise in US rates had a negative effect on the 
demand by international investors for emerging market new issues, which put an 
upward pressure on spreads. 
However, recent research on the determinants of secondary market spreads 
(rather than the launch spreads) has generally documented that both domestic and 
international factors played a role in the evolution of spreads. Arora and Cerisola 
(2001) analyzed the determinants of secondary market spreads for eleven emerging 
countries over the period 1994-1999. They found that both the country-specific 
fundamentals and US monetary policy had an impact on spreads. Kamin (2002) 
estimated an OLS error-correction equation for the EMBI spread and found 
statistically significant coefficients on the lagged level of the EMBI spread, lagged 
level of the US corporate spread and the contemporaneous change in US corporate 
spread (a measure of risk appetite of foreign investors) for the period 1992-2001. 
The significance of the lagged level of the EMBI spread points to a strong mean-
reverting tendency of the EMBI.  Using annual averages calculated from daily 
EMBI spreads for 28 countries over the 1994 – 2004 period, Hilscher and 
Nosbusch (2004) showed that debt to GDP ratios and risk appetite of foreign 
investors were important determinants of the spreads. Favero and Giavazzi (2004)  6  
 
documented that Brazil’s EMBI spread increased by an increase in the US 
corporate spread and Brazil’s debt to GDP ratio, over the period 1999-2003. The 
findings of Blanchard (2004) are similar. Hence, the evidence documented in 
recent literature points to the risk appetite of foreign investors and debt to GDP 
ratios of emerging markets as the most important determinants of sovereign 
spreads.  
These studies generally considered various fiscal policy and foreign debt-
service indicators as macroeconomic fundamentals. However, while the debt to 
GDP ratio, for example, is an important indicator of the current stance of 
macroeconomic policy, it does not reveal much information regarding the future 
policies and intentions of policymakers. More important for investors is whether 
the current stance of fiscal policy is going to change and the direction of such a 
change. Political developments and announcements of international organizations 
can provide such information. Similarly, literature has generally considered current 
levels of US Treasury bond yields or Fed short-term interest rates as indicators of 
international risk factors. In a recent study, Gürkaynak et al. (2005) investigated 
the effects of US monetary policy on asset prices in the US. They showed that not 
only the policy actions of the Fed but also its statements had important but varying 
effects on asset prices, with statements having a much greater impact on longer-
term Treasury yields. 
This paper adds to existing literature in several dimensions. First, we use 
high frequency (daily) secondary market data. The results of both country-specific 
and panel regressions are provided. For comparison purposes we also show the  7  
 
estimation results of the models with monthly frequency. Second, we analyze the 
impact of Fed announcements on the spreads along the lines of Gürkaynak et al. 
(2005). Third, by focusing on the Turkish data, we analyze the impact of political 
developments in addition to international factors and macroeconomic fundamentals 
on the EMBI spread, and thus bring a political economy perspective to the 
literature. Fourth, country-specific variables are not well captured in studies that 
use a cross section or pooled data. This study, in addition to political developments, 
as discussed below, takes the effects of the evolution of IMF relations and the 
European Union (EU) accession process into consideration. Hence, the data set we 
use provides the chance of testing whether macroeconomic fundamentals and 
international interest rates still have explanatory power for fluctuations in the 
EMBI spread once controlled for such specific factors. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. The following section gives detailed 
information regarding our methodology and the data set. The third section provides 
the estimation results for a group of 21 emerging economies. It is shown that both 
international and domestic factors play a role in the evolution of spreads. The 
appetite for risk of foreign investors is the most important common determinant of 
spreads. Fed announcements do not have an impact on spreads. The impact of 
political news and announcements of international institutions are analyzed for the 
Turkish component of the EMBI spread in the fourth section. It is shown that news 
releases of this kind do have a significant impact on spreads. The last section 
concludes. 
  8  
 
2.  Methodology and data 
The most general model employed in literature on the empirical 
determinants of sovereign spreads is a relationship of the form 




t t i i t t us t u x r c s
1
, 2 , 1 β θ α α ,     (1) 
where s is the log of EMBI spreads, c is a constant term, rus is the yield on US 
treasury bonds or Fed funds rate, θ is a proxy for the risk appetite of foreign 
investors (generally the spread between the yield on US corporate bonds rated 
BBB+ with a maturity of 10 years and a 10-year US treasury bond), xi is the i
th 
domestic macroeconomic variable, and u is the error term. Since the sovereign 
spread of a country is a measure of its default risk, domestic macroeconomic 
variables included in the models are indicators of the default risk of that country. 
Debt, net foreign assets, the fiscal balance, gross reserves all as ratios to the GDP 
of the country, debt service ratios, credit ratings, changes in terms of trade are 
among the most commonly employed domestic default indicators. 
Summary results of estimation models for the determinants of emerging 
economies secondary market sovereign spreads in recent literature are provided in 
Table 1. With the exception of Hilscher and Nosbusch (2004), all of the studies 
reported in the table used monthly data. The striking fact is that the coefficients of 
alternative measures for the US treasury yield were not significant in Kamin and 
Kleist (1999) and Kamin (2002), whereas the coefficient of this variable is negative 
in Hilscher and Nosbusch (2004). The only significant and positive coefficient was 
reported by Arora and Cerisola (2001) and this is for the Fed funds rate. However, 
when the risk appetite of foreign investors as measured by the US corporate default 
spread is included its coefficient appears to be positive and significant (Kamin  9  
 
(2002), Blanchard (2004) –not reported in the table, Favero and Giavazzi (2004), 
and Hilscher and Nosbusch (2004)). Arora and Cerisola (2001) also included the 
volatility of spread between the US 3-month treasury yield and Fed target rate and 
reported a positive and significant coefficient. Regarding domestic macroeconomic 
fundamentals, the coefficients of debt to GDP ratios are significant and correctly 
signed in all of the models. Arora and Cerisola (2001) employed various other 
domestic macroeconomic variables and found correctly signed and significant 
coefficients for some of them. Hilscher and Nosbusch (2004) included terms of 
trade as an additional variable and reported significant and correctly signed 
coefficients. 
Kamin and Kleist (1999) emphasized that when they used the level of the 
spread as the dependent variable the equation was subject to extreme 
autocorrelation. Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests they found that the 
variables used in the regressions were not stationary in level terms. Hence, they 
reported results for the first difference of the spread as well. Note that Kamin 
(2002) estimated an error-correction model for the spreads due to the same reason. 
Similarly, Arora and Cerisola (2001) provided results of the Philips-Perron test for 
co-integration and showed that in eight out of 11 cases sovereign spreads were co-
integrated with the various explanatory variables shown in Table 1. While 
diagnostic test results for autocorrelation were not reported in Favero and Giavazzi 
(2004), they plausibly included the first lag of the dependent variable as an 
additional explanatory variable in their models in order to control the 
autocorrelation.  10  
 
Table 1 
Summary results of estimation models for the determinants of emerging economies secondary market sovereign spreads in the recent 
literature
a 
   Kamin and Kleist   Arora and Cerisola  Kamin  Favero and Giavazzi  Hilscher and Nosbuch 
 (1999)  (2001)  (2002)  (2004)  (2004) 
      10 countries, P, M  11 countries, TS, M  Index, EC, M  Brazil, NL, M  28 countries, P, A 
                               Time period         1991.1 - 1997.6  1994.4 - 1999.12  1992.3 - 2001.11  1991.2 - 2003.6  1994 - 2004 
                               Dependent variable  log (spread)  Dlog (spread)  log (spread)  Dlog (spread)  log (spread)  spread 
International risk factors  Full      Sub
b  Full      Sub         
  US 3-month treasury yield  +          ns  +          ns    ns
e    
  US 10-year treasury yield         ns    - 
  US 30-year treasury yield   Al
c.:ns    ns  Al.:ns    ns         
  FED funds rate      + (11/11)
d      
  Volatility of spread between US 3-month     + (8/11)       
   treasury yield and FED target rate              
  US corporate default spread        +  +
f Al.:+ 
Domestic risk factors            
  Ratings        ns     
  Debt / GDP       + (6/6)    +  + 
  Volatility of terms of trade            + 
  Change in terms of trade            - 
  Net foreign assets / GDP       - (7/7)       
  Fiscal balance / GDP      - (3/3)       
  Reserves / GDP      - (3/10)       
  Debt service ratio       + (2/3)       
  Indicator for default history                 - 
a P: Panel, M: Monthly, TS: Time series, EC: Error-correction, NL: non-linear least squares, A: Annual. A '+' sign indicates that the coefficient of the explanatory variable is positive 
and significant at least at 10 percent level. Similarly, a '-' sign indicates that the relevant coefficient is negative and significant, whereas 'ns' shows that the relevant coefficient is not 
significant. 
b Sub sample is 1995.1 - 1997.6. 
c 'Al.' stands for an alternative estimation. In Kamin and Kleist (1999) and Kamin (2002) US 30-year treasury yield is used as an alternative to US 3-month treasury yield. In 
Hilscher and Nosbuch (2004) US corporate default spread is used as an alternative to US 10-year treasury yield. 
d '(x/y)' indicates that the relevant explanatory variable is included in the regressions for 'y' countries and out of 'y' coefficients 'x' of them are significant. 
e In Kamin's error-correction model both the lagged levels and the contemporaneous first differences of the explanatory variables are included. In this case 'ns' ('+') denotes 
insignificance (significance) for the coefficients of both the levels and first differences of the relevant variable. 
f For the debt to GDP ratio above 54 percent, the response of spread to US corporate default spread increases non-linearly 
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Based on these results two observations follow: first, models that use levels 
of sovereign spreads as the dependent variable should be interpreted as exploring 
long-term relationships (more on this issue below). Second, international investors’ 
appetite for risk, debt to GDP ratio, and various volatility measures are important 
determinants of emerging market spreads. Hence, both international risk factors 
and domestic macroeconomic fundamentals derive long-term movements of 
secondary market sovereign spreads. Note that this contrasts the findings of Calvo, 
who argued that once one accounts for the investors’ appetite for risk, domestic 
factors in emerging markets do not play any significant role in explaining emerging 
market spreads.
2 
2.1.  Methodology and data for 21 emerging countries 
In the third section we report the estimation results of Eq. (1) for 21 
emerging countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Mexico, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, 
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela. In contrast to 
studies reported in Table 1 that used either monthly or annual data, we used daily 
data for the December 31, 1997 – December 31, 2004 period. For some countries 
the sample size is shorter. Hence, the maximum number of observations is 1750, 
whereas the shortest sample size is for South Africa and the number of 
observations is 742 (April 30, 1998 – July 30, 2002). Our dependent variable is the 
EMBI spread of each country. For alternative potential international deriving 
forces of spreads we considered the US federal funds target rate, yield on 2-year 
US treasury bonds, yield on 10-year US treasury bonds, and a proxy for  12  
 
international investors’ appetite for risk. As in, for example, Blanchard (2004), 
Favero and Giavazzi (2004), Hilscher and Nosbusch (2004), international 
investors’ appetite for risk was defined as the spread of US corporate bonds with a 
Moody’s rating of Baa and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US treasuries. In 
addition to these variables, following Arora and Cerisola (2001), we included the 
fitted values for the conditional standard error from a GARCH (1,1) model for the 
spread between the three-month yield on the US treasury bill and the federal funds 
target rate as a proxy for international market volatility as another explanatory 
variable. 
Making use of high frequency data puts a constraint on the usage of 
potential domestic factors as explanatory variables. As emphasized in the 
preceding paragraphs, various indicators of fiscal policy, terms of trade, and 
indicators for the debt servicing capability of a country are among such potential 
factors. However, Cantor and Packer (1996, pp.49) showed that “sovereign ratings 
effectively summarize and supplement the information contained in 
macroeconomic indicators and therefore strongly correlated with market-
determined credit spreads.” For a cross-section of thirty-five countries, they found 
that once the rating variable is included as an explanatory variable along with 
domestic macroeconomic variables, domestic factors become collectively and 
individually insignificant. Based on this observation, Kamin and Kleist (1999) used 
ratings by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, instead of various country 
performance variables. Similarly, Eichengreen and Mody (1998) included a 
measure of country credit-worthiness derived from data provided by Institutional  13  
 
Investor. In what follows, for high-frequency regressions, we included sovereign 
ratings by Standard and Poor’s and alternative credit-worthiness data provided by 
Institutional Investor, as a proxy for domestic factors. The assignment of numerical 
values to credit ratings is as in Kamin and Kleist (1999), with 1 being the worst 
credit risk and 22 the best, whereas the credit-worthiness data of the Institutional 
Investor is on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of 
default. To check robustness of our results, we estimated Eq. (1) using monthly 
data and various domestic macroeconomic variables, as well. These variables are 
fiscal balance, public debt, net foreign assets, exports (all as shares in GDP) and 
credit ratings. For the long-run determinants of EMBI spreads related to 21 
countries, final results are derived from a panel estimation using both daily and 
monthly data.
3 
What are the short-run determinants of EMBI spreads? Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests show that the variables used in the regressions are not 
stationary in level terms. Hence, documented evidence for level data can at best be 
suggestive for long-term relations between the variables. To capture short-run 
dynamics while preserving the long-run information, we estimated error-correction 
models for the countries in our sample. The most general form of the estimated 
models is of the following type: 
∑∑ + + ∆ +








t t j j t i i
t t t us t us t t
x x
r r s c s
11
1 , ,
1 5 4 1 , 3 , 2 1 1
ε δ β
θ α θ α α α α
,   (2)  14  
 
where ∆ is the first difference operator. As noted by Blinder and Deaton (1985), 
this is a flexible distributed lag model and nests many of the specifications that 
have been discussed in the literature –including the error-correction model. For 
example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and Kamin (2002), among others, used this 
specification.  
In a recent study Gürkaynak et al. (2005) investigated the effects of US 
monetary policy on asset prices in the US. They showed that not only the policy 
actions of the Fed but also its statements had important but differing effects on 
asset prices, with statements having a much greater impact on longer-term Treasury 
yields. In the final part of the third section, we turn to the effects of Fed 
announcements on emerging spreads, which has not yet been tackled in literature. 
Basically, we used event study methodology. Events are the Federal Open Market 
Committee’s (FOMC) announcements in the January 1998 –December 2004 
period. Gürkaynak et al. (2005, pp.57) used “the term ‘announcement’ to refer to 
any means by which a policy decision was communicated to financial markets, 
including operations as well as explicit press releases”. First, we took a symmetric 
window of two, five and ten-day lengths around each FOMC statement and 
checked whether there is a change in the mean and variance of the sovereign spread 
of each country in our sample. The maximum number of total events is 60, while 
for Qatar the number of total events drops to 11. Second, using the two-factor 
approach of Gürkaynak et al. (2005), we estimated the following event-regression: 
t t t o t Z Z s ε α α α + + + = ∆ , 2 2 , 1 1 ,       ( 3 )   15  
 
where ∆s is the change in the spread between the pre-event and post-event, with 
changes calculated for different lengths of windows –minimum one-day and 
maximum 5-days. Z1 and Z2 are respectively the “target factor” and “path factor” 
defined in Gürkaynak et al. (2005). They argued that the effects of Fed monetary 
policy announcements on asset prices were not adequately characterized by a 
single factor but by the surprise component of the change in the current federal 
funds rate target. Instead, they found that two factors were required. They gave a 
structural interpretation to these factors: “current federal funds rate target” factor 
(Z1) and “future path of policy” factor (Z2). 
2.2.  Methodology and data for the impact of political news on Turkish spreads  
As noted in the introduction, while various domestic factors used by the 
literature to explain sovereign spreads are among the important indicators of the 
current stance of macroeconomic policy, they do not reveal much information for 
the future policies and intentions of policymakers. Political news and the 
announcements of international organizations can provide extra information 
regarding whether the current stance of fiscal policy is going to change and the 
direction of such a change. In order to analyze the impact of political developments 
in addition to international factors and macroeconomic fundamentals on the EMBI 
spread, and thus bring a political economy perspective to the literature, in the 
fourth section we focus on developments in the post-crisis period in Turkey.  
We used daily data for the May 16, 2001 – December 31, 2004 period. The 
beginning date of the period marks the starting date of the IMF backed program. We  16  
 
estimated Eq. (2) with additional explanatory variables to capture the effects of 
various news releases on spreads. For news events, our main information source is 
Reuters. In addition, we checked that the analysis in Reuters is consistent with that of 
the Anatolian News Agency, local and foreign financial papers. We classified news 
into three categories: (1) political news; (2) announcements made by the IMF; (3) 
structural reform process towards the EU accession. We then classified each item of 
news in these categories as either “good” or “bad”. Note that our news releases 
selection, classification, and transformation to dummy variables methodology is in 
line with the literature. For example, Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998), Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (1998), and Baig and Goldfajn (1999) estimated the impact of various 
news events on movements in financial markets. They map daily news of a country 
into a set of dummy variables (like good and bad news for each category of news) to 
quantify the impact of such news releases on financial markets. Kim and Mei (2001), 
Fornari  et al. (2002), and Blasco et al. (2002) followed almost an identical 
procedure. The first of these studies explicitly classifies political news as good and 
bad news and forms dummy variables accordingly. The second study maps various 
kinds of news releases into aggregated good and bad dummy variables, but mainly 
with a political focus. It is interesting to note that Blasco et al. (2002) concentrated 
on news such as joining the EU.      
In the period analyzed, there are hundreds of such news events and most of 
them are irrelevant from the perspective of this paper given that they are either 
mainly in the form of trivial talk or in some other cases original news is followed by 
similar news after very short intervals. Hence, the first issue is to reduce the number  17  
 
of news events to a manageable level. In order to decrease the risk of subjectivity and 
bias, the following procedure was adopted:  
First, only political news that falls in one of the following categories was 
considered: (i) good news: (1) resolution of conflicts within the government 
regarding taking the necessary steps on the structural reform agenda of the IMF 
supported program; (2) signals of financial support from the US; (3) formation of a 
strong government after the elections; (ii) bad news: (1) disagreement within the 
coalition government; (2) chaos in parliament and election risk; (3) the 
hospitalization of Prime Minister Ecevit and early election talks; (3) news related 
September 11, Iraqi war and blasts hit in Istanbul. 
Second, regarding IMF news, a postponement of a scheduled board meeting 
was classified as bad news, whereas an agreement with the IMF and approval of 
credit were taken as good news. Third, EU related news was classified as good news 
whenever the Turkish parliament passed a reform towards EU accession or EU 
member countries signaled backing Turkey’s membership. Conversely, opposition of 
EU countries for Turkey’s membership as well as the negative developments at the 
end of 2002 about giving a “date” for Turkey starting negotiations were classified as 
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3.  The determinants of spreads 
Below we report both the long-run and short-run estimation results for the 
determinants of spreads of 21 emerging countries. The results provided are for 
daily and monthly data for individual countries as well as a panel of 21 countries. 
3.1.  Long-run determinants of spreads of 21 emerging countries 
Table 2 presents the OLS estimation results of Eq. (1) for the 21 emerging 
countries stated in the preceding section. The frequency of the data is daily. For 
more than half of the countries (13 out of 21 countries), the coefficients of the Fed 
target rate are negative in contrast to expected sign. In most cases the coefficients 
of the US corporate bond spread and Institutional Investor rating are as expected. 
Exceptions are the US corporate bond spread for Russia and Korea, Institutional 
Investor rating for Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Philippines and Turkey. When the 
sovereign ratings of Standard and Poor’s were used, the coefficient of the corporate 
bond spread for South Korea and Institutional Investor rating for Ecuador, 
Philippines and Turkey are correctly signed. All of the coefficients with the 
exception of Colombia’s and Egypt’s rating and Fed target rate in Philippines using 
Standard and Poor’s rating are significant at the one percent level. As in the studies 
cited in the preceding section the Durbin Watson test statistics are very low. Note 
that this is a long-run estimation. For eight countries, the variables included in the 
regressions are co-integrated. Using US Treasury 2-year or 10-year bond rates 
instead of the Fed target rate makes difference in a few cases slightly but does not 
affect the overall results. Hence, we do not report those results.  19  
 
Table 2 
Long-run determinants of EMBI spreads for 21 emerging countries  
(Daily frequency, December 31, 1997 - December 31, 2004)
a 
         Coefficients
b         











rating  Adjusted R
2; DW t-values
d 
Argentina 1750  -1.240  0.792  -0.472  0.94;  0.03  -3.0 
Brazil 1750  -0.104  0.935  -1.794  0.34;  0.02  -2.5 
Bulgaria  1750  0.138  1.166  -2.073  0.91; 0.04  -3.1 (1) 
Colombia
e 1398  -0.057  0.871  0.047  0.56;  0.03  -3.6 
Ecuador 1750  0.225  1.206  0.688  0.43;  0.01  -2.2 
   (With S&P rating)  1104  -0.228  1.201  -0.432  0.72; 0.09  -3.7 (3) 
Egypt  648 -0.269  2.677 0.747 0.80;  0.12  -3.7  (1) 
Mexico 1750  -0.052  0.812  -3.651  0.78;  0.04  -3.9* 
Malaysia
e  730  -0.162  0.994  -2.946  0.85; 0.08  -3.5 (1) 
Morocco  1750  0.109  0.895  -5.294  0.76; 0.05  -4.0 (1)* 
Nigeria  1750  -0.121  1.46  -1.893  0.77; 0.06  -4.5 (1)** 
Panama 1750  -0.039  0.538  -0.777  0.49;  0.04  -4.4** 
Peru 1750  0.071  0.714  -1.29  0.59;  0.03  -3.3 
Philippines
e 1586  -0.031  0.400  0.376  0.28;  0.02  -1.6 
   (With S&P rating)  1586  0.003 0.457  -0.871 0.29;  0.02  -1.75 
Poland  1750  0.128  1.450  -6.224  0.81; 0.09  -4.0 (3)* 
Qatar
e  310  0.105  1.195  -1.19  0.92;  0.31  -5.0** 
Russia  1750  0.577  -0.197  -1.428  0.67;  0.01  -1.8 
S. Africa
e  670  -0.212  1.154  -2.036  0.83; 0.18  -4.3 (1)** 
S. Korea
e 1062  0.681  -0.787  -0.633  0.54;  0.02  -2.3 
   (With S&P rating)  1062  0.108 0.445  -6.835 0.88;  0.08  -4.4** 
Turkey
e 1355  -0.422  1.738  0.357  0.55;  0.03  -3.5 
   (With S&P rating)  1355  -0.14  0.948  -1.739  0.75; 0.04  -3.0 (1) 
Ukraine
e  845  0.373  1.216  -0.658  0.86; 0.08  -3.7 (1) 
Venezuela 1750  0.019  0.731  -0.679  0.29;  0.02  -2.2 
a  All of the explanatory variables, except market volatility, are in logarithms. 
b The insignificant coefficients are the Colombia's and Egypt’s rating and Fed target rate for Philippines when 
estimated with Standard and Poor’s rating. All other coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
c The spread of US corporate bonds with a BBB+ rating and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US Treasury bond 
yields. 
d Engle-Granger two-step test results. * and ** respectively denote significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels. 
e Samples for these countries: Colombia: 28.05. 1999- 31.12.2004; Egypt: 31.05.2002-31.12.2004; Malaysia: 
31.01.2002-30.12.2004; Qatar: 29.12.2000-29.08.2002; S. Africa: 30.04.2002-2004.12; Korea: 30.04.1998-
30.07.2002; Turkey: 30.07.1999-31.02.2004; Ukraine: 10.08.2001-31.12.2004. For Philippines, the values 
between 1998.11-1999.04, for Qatar, the values between 2001.07-2001.12 are missing in data. 
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Table 3 reports the estimation results of Eq. (1) for an unbalanced panel of 
21 countries. Again the frequency of the data is daily. All of the coefficients are 
significant and the signs are as expected. The only exception is the coefficient of 
the market volatility in the regression VI, which is not significant although it has 
the expected sign. 
Table 3 
Long-run determinants of EMBI spreads for a panel of 21 emerging countries 
(Daily frequency, December 31, 1997 - December 31, 2004)
a 
                                  Coefficients
b       
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
            
Constant 13.405  13.407  13.442 13.473 7.792 7.795 
FED target rate  0.096  0.096      0.179  0.176 
US Treasury 2-year bond yield      0.085       
US Treasury 10-year bond yield        0.062     
US corporate bond spread
c 0.680  0.677  0.730  0.764  0.477  0.47 
Market volatility
d   0.212        0.81 
            
Institutional Investor rating  -2.049 -2.049 -2.066 -2.076     
S&P rating          -0.863  -0.863 
            
Number of countries  21  21  21  21  20  20 
Number of observations  29604  29591  29604  29604  27080  27070 
Adjusted R
2 0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84 
a All of the explanatory variables, except market volatility, are in logarithms. Unbalanced panel. 
b All of the coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, except market volatility in column VI. 
c The spread of US corporate bonds with BBB+  rating and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US Treasury bond 
yields. 
d Obtained from a GARCH(1,1) model for the spread of 3-month US Treasury bill rate over FED target rate.  21  
 
The studies cited in the preceding section used either monthly or annual 
data. To compare our results with the results of these studies and check the 
robustness of our results, we estimated Eq. (1) using monthly data. Using a lower 
data frequency allowed us to make use of various macroeconomic indicators in 
addition to the rating variables. The results are reported in Table 4. The estimated 
coefficients of the Fed target rate are generally in line with the estimations results 
using daily data. The signs of the coefficients of the US corporate bond spread are 
robust to the change in the frequency of the data excluding Malaysian and Russian 
cases. With the exception of Panama and Turkey, they are all significant. The 
evidence is mixed for the signs and significance levels of the domestic 
macroeconomic variables.  
Table 5 presents the estimation results of Eq. (1) for an unbalanced panel 
of 21 countries. The frequency of the data is monthly. All of the coefficients are 
significant at a level of one percent with the exception of the coefficient of fiscal 
balance in column IV and the Fed target rate in column VIII. The Fed target rate in 
column III, IV, VIII, and US Treasury bond yield in column V and VI have wrong 
signs. The signs of the remaining coefficients are as expected. One further point 
that deserves emphasis is that, in contrast to the findings of Cantor and Packer 
(1996, pp.49), once the rating variable is included as an explanatory variable along 
with domestic macroeconomic variables, domestic factors do not become 
insignificant. 
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Table 4 
Long-run determinants of EMBI spreads for 21 emerging countries (Monthly frequency, January 1998 - December 2004)
a 
                               Coefficients
b               
  No. of    US Corporate               
Countries   obs.  FED target rate  bond spread
c  Ins. Inv. Rating
d   Debt / GDP NFA/GDP  Exports / GDP  Adjusted R
2; DW 
Argentina 84 -1.131***  0.938***  0.881**  -0.795* -0.035**  1.767***  0.95 ; 0.50 
Brazil 84  -0.105  0.549**  1.334*  -0.859** -0.263***  -0.247  0.61 ; 0.30 
Bulgaria 84 0.085*  0.528***  0.343  2.341*** -0.063***  -0.388**  0.96 ; 0.53 
Colombia
e 68  0.133  0.635***  0.228  -1.256***  0.114*** -0.716***  0.73 ; 0.53 
Ecuador 84  -0.590**  1.089***  2.237***  3.051* -0.007  -0.325  0.80 ; 0.54 
Egypt
e 32  0.401  0.764*  -1.399  0.553  0.032 -2.143 0.96 ; 1.48 
Mexico 84  -0.156*  1.037***  1.264*  2.381*** -0.061  -3.503***  0.89 ; 0.53 
Malaysia
e 24  -0.032  -0.313  3.949**  13.354*** -0.014  18.142**  0.92 ; 1.45 
Morocco 84  -0.253***  1.002***  -0.408  2.527*** 0.002  -3.357***  0.88 ; 0.51 
Nigeria 84  -0.046  1.052***  -1.359*** 1.261*** -0.004  -0.905***  0.81 ; 0.54 
Panama 84  0.002**  0.657  -1.056***  0.466*** 0.008  -0.399  0.50 ; 0.49 
Peru 84  0.096  0.797***  -1.057**  -1.495** 0.024  -0.069  0.60 ; 0.40 
Philippines
e 77  -0.208***  0.577***  0.669  -0.074 -0.031**  0.566*  0.38 ; 0.36 
Poland 84  0.103  0.656***  -3.035*** -0.640** 0.084**  -1.829***  0.87 ; 0.51 
Qatar
e 16  0.117* 1.183***  -0.389   0.004    0.96 ; 1.98 
Russia 84  -0.700***  1.818***  0.011  -2.203*** -0.272***  4.405***  0.94 ; 0.34 
S. Africa
e 33 -0.658***  1.129***  0.089  -2.051 -0.084  4.885  0.89 ; 1.00 
S. Korea
e 52  0.075  1.015***  2.954***    -0.094*** 3.353***  0.89 ; 0.77 
Turkey
e 66 0.122  0.229  0.916**  1.561***  -0.058*** -0.266*  0.77 ; 0.42 
Ukraine
e 41  -0.202  1.908***  0.403  -3.739 -0.277*  6.672***  0.90 ; 0.82 
Venezuela 84 -0.526***  1.158***  0.671  2.796*** -0.061***  -0.307  0.76 ; 0.74 
a All of the variables, except net foreign assets (NFA), are in logarithms. 
b *, **, *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
c The spread of US corporate bonds with a BBB+ rating and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US Treasury bond yields. 
d Institutional Investor rating 
e Samples for these countries: Colombia: 1999.05-2004-12; Egypt: 2002.05-2004.12; Malaysia: 2002.01-2003.12; Qatar: 2000.12-2002.08; S. Africa: 2002.04-2004.12; Korea: 
1998.04-2002.07; Turkey: 1999.07-20004.12; Ukraine: 2001.08-2004.12. For Philippines, the values between 1998.11-1999.04, for Qatar, the values between 2001.07-2001.12 are 
missing in data. 
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Table 5 
Long-run determinants of EMBI spreads for a panel of 21 emerging countries (Monthly frequency, January 1998 – December 2004)
a 
                                               Coefficients
b             
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
Constant 13.377 9.463 7.857 7.878 7.873 8.373 7.803 6.129
FED target rate  0.101 0.089 -0.047 -0.035    0.186 -0.018
US Treasury 2-year bond yield          -0.088      
US Treasury 10-year bond yield            -0.419    
US corporate bond spread
c 0.676 0.633 0.679 0.643 0.676 0.688 0.467 0.549
Fiscal balance / GDP        -0.007        
Total public debt / GDP    0.593 1.109 1.076 1.129 1.178  1.032
Net foreign assets / GDP      -0.028 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028  -0.029
Exports / GDP      -0.560 -0.499 -0.581 -0.627   -0.684
Institutional Investor rating  -2.041 -1.514 -0.938 -0.966 -0.926 -0.919 -0.869  
S&P  rating          -0.471
          
Number of countries  21 19 19 18 19 19 20 18
Number of observations  1429 1361 1349 1305 1349 1349 1311 1231
Adjusted R
2 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.84 0.89
a All of the explanatory variables, except fiscal balance and net foreign asset, are in logarithms. Unbalanced panel. 
b All of the coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, except the coefficients of fiscal balance in Equation IV and Fed target rate in Equation VIII, which are insignificant. 
c The spread of US corporate bonds with a BBB+ rating and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US Treasury bond yields.  24  
 
What do these results tell us? Both international and domestic factors play an 
important role in the long-run evolution of emerging market spreads. Individual country and 
panel estimates using daily data and panel estimates using monthly data show that risk 
appetite of international investors and sovereign ratings are important determinants of long-
run movements of spreads. Monthly panel estimates also indicate that fiscal balance, public 
debt, net foreign assets and exports as ratios to GDP are among the important determinants 
of the monthly evolution of spreads.  
3.2.  Short-run determinants of spreads of 21 emerging countries 
The estimation results of Eq. (2) for 21 emerging countries are presented in Table 6. 
The frequency of the data is daily. The lagged level of the EMBI spread is correctly signed 
and significant in most of the cases which points to a mean- reverting tendency of the EMBI. 
The rating variable is both correctly signed and significant for 10 countries either in lagged-
level or contemporaneous change form. Only for Egypt and Russia, it is both significant and 
incorrectly signed. The lagged level of the Fed target rate is correctly signed in more than 
half of the cases and significant in ten cases. Its first difference is only significant for two 
countries one of which has wrong sign. The results of the panel estimates, presented in Table 
7, are in line with those of individual country estimates for the mean-reverting tendency of 
the EMBI. The lagged levels of the Fed target rate and rating variable are correctly signed 
and significant, while in the first difference form, rating in all cases and Fed target rate in the 
column IV are correctly signed but insignificant. The first difference of the US corporate 
spread is correctly signed in three out of the four cases while significant in all cases.  25  
 
However, the estimated coefficients of its lagged level have significantly incorrect sign in all 
of the estimates. 
In monthly regressions, presented in Table 8 and 9, findings for the lagged level of 
the EMBI spread and the US corporate bond spread are in line with daily estimates. The 
results of the individual country estimates do not give a clear cut idea of the effects of the 
variables that proxy the domestic macroeconomic variables. However, panel estimates show 
that total public debt, exports and net foreign assets to GDP ratios are important determinants 
of the short run fluctuations of the EMBI spread. The rating variable is another significant 
determinant. 
Our results show that the contemporaneous change in the US corporate bond spread 
has a considerable effect on the short run fluctuations of the EMBI spread. This is valid 
regardless of the frequency of the data and both for individual and country and panel 
estimates. Domestic macroeconomic variables have also important impact on the short-run 
behavior of spreads. The Fed target rate does not play an important role. Hence, these results 
are in line with the findings for the long run evolution of the spreads. 
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Table 6  
Short-run determinants of EMBI spreads for 21 emerging countries (Daily frequency, December 31, 1997 - December 31, 2004)
a 
a The dependent variable is the log first difference of EMBI spread. All of the explanatory variables are in logarithms. For each country, number of observations is one less than that 
given in Table 2. 
b *, **, *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  
c The spread of US corporate bonds with a BBB+ rating and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US Treasury bond yields. 
 
                                           Coefficients 
b          
  Lagged level of                FED target rate        US corporate bond spread
c       Institutional Investor rating  Adjusted 
Countries   EMBI spread  Lagged level First difference Lagged level First difference  Lagged level  First difference  R
2 
Argentina -0.008**  -0.016***  0.027 0.009**  0.020  0.007  0.041  0.003 
Brazil -0.002  0.002  -0.046  -0.003 0.005  0.015  -0.046  -0.00002 
Bulgaria -0.004  0.002  -0.080**  0.001 -0.018  -0.012  -0.278***  0.01 
Colombia -0.010***  -0.001  -0.013 0.011*  0.018  0.001  -0.10  0.001 
Ecuador -0.003  0.003*  -0.004  -0.002 -0.014  0.005  -0.041  0.0002 
   (With S&P rating)  -0.020***  -0.007*** -0.008 0.030***  0.009  -0.004  0.003  0.01 
Egypt -0.013*  0.003  0.157*  0.043 0.090  -0.065  0.879* 0.01 
Mexico -0.023***  0.009**  0.119  -0.010 0.156*  -0.093  -1.292***  0.03 
Malaysia -0.019**  -0.004  -0.013 0.017  0.059  -0.068*  0.324  0.003 
Morocco -0.016***  0.004*  0.049  0.011* -0.030  -0.086**  -0.106  0.01 
Nigeria -0.016***  0.0003  -0.031  0.017** 0.146***  -0.033*  -0.058  0.01 
Panama -0.015***  -0.0002  0.029  0.007 0.033  -0.017  -0.270**  0.01 
Peru -0.007*  0.002*  -0.013  0.002 -0.034  -0.012  0.010 0.001 
Philippines -0.003  0.002**  0.011  -0.003 0.032  0.005  0.062 0.001 
Poland -0.031***  0.007**  -0.030  0.037*** 0.227***  -0.171***  -0.708  0.02 
Qatar -0.090***  0.010*  0.078  0.090** 0.274***  -0.154  0.808  0.04 
Russia -0.0001  0.007***  0.013  -0.007** 0.015  0.012**  -0.014  0.01 
S. Africa  -0.054***  -0.004  -0.029 0.043*  0.090  -0.175***  0.045  0.02 
S. Korea  -0.012***  0.012***  0.125  -0.020*** 0.165*  0.048**  0.380*  0.02 
   (With S&P rating)  -0.023***  0.009** 0.119  -0.010  0.156*  -0.093  -1.292***  0.03 
Turkey -0.006**  -0.003  -0.014 0.014**  0.034  0.011  0.148*  0.01 
   (With S&P rating)  -0.007*  -0.001 -0.013  0.014**  0.035  -0.003  -0.201**  0.004 
Ukraine -0.025***  0.012  -0.069  0.016 0.078  -0.020  -0.051  0.006 
Venezuela -0.003  0.0003  0.002  -0.004 0.001  0.018  0.060 0.001   27  
 
Table 7  
Short-run determinants of EMBI spreads for a panel of 21 emerging countries (Daily frequency, December 31, 1997 - December 31, 
2004)
a 
                                   Coefficients
b    
  I  II  III  IV 
Constant 0.034***  0.031***  0.016*  0.0252*** 
First lag of EMBI spread  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.004*** 
FED target rate         
    First lag  0.002***      0.002*** 
    First difference  -0.0001      0.006 
US Treasury 2-year bond yield         
    First lag    0.003***     
    First difference    -0.350***     
US Treasury 10-year bond yield         
    First lag      0.008***   
    First difference      -0.726***   
US corporate bond spread
c        
    First lag  -0.002**  -0.003***  -0.002**  -0.002** 
    First difference  0.034***  0.018*  0.006  0.030*** 
Institutional Investor rating         
    First lag  -0.005**  -0.004**  -0.004**   
    First difference  -0.007  -0.016  -0.013   
S&P rating         
    First lag        -0.003*** 
    First difference        -0.006 
Number of countries  21  21  21  20 
Number of observations  29581  29581  29581  27058 
Adjusted R
2 0.002  0.07  0.08  0.002 
a The dependent variable is the log first difference of EMBI spread. All of the explanatory variables are in logarithms. Unbalanced panel. 
b *, **, *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
c The spread of US corporate bonds with a BBB+ rating and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US Treasury bond yields. 
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Table 8  
Short-run determinants of EMBI spreads for 21 emerging countries (Monthly frequency, January 1998 - December 2004)
a
 
                            Coefficients
b                                   
  Lagged     FED target rate   Corp. bond spread
c     Ins. Inv. Rating
d     Total debt / GDP         NFA / GDP      Exports / GDP  Adjusted
Countries   spread     First lag    First diff.   First lag   First diff.   First lag    First diff.   First lag    First diff.   First lag   First diff.   First lag    First diff. R
2 
Argentina  -0.370***  -0.467*** -0.165** 0.259* 0.612** -0.102 -0.052 -0.149**   0.133 0.012 -0.205** 0.454 0.108 0.24 
Brazil  -0.289***   -0.044 -0.199 0.088 0.695*** 0.116 0.201 0.175   2.187* -0.014 -0.237*** -0.131 0.798*** 0.50 
Bulgaria  -0.264***   0.015 -0.303 0.075 0.640*** 0.166 0.168 0.676*   3.630 -0.029** -0.057** 0.115 -0.388 0.28 
Colombia  -0.310***   -0.012 0.225 0.185 0.759*** 0.123 0.167 0.260   2.080 0.012 0.327*** -0.168 -0.325 0.42 
Ecuador  -0.256**   0.069 0.098 0.254 0.777** 0.901 0.778 2.910   -10.790 0.180 -0.844 -3.032 8.430 0.16 
Egypt  -1.195***   1.173*** 0.797** 1.36** 0.413 -3.100* -0.790 21.921*   -24.131 1.561 -19.510** -15.397 209.874** 0.55 
Mexico  -0.272***   0.011 0.044 0.135 0.760*** 0.678 -0.036 0.808   21.024 0.083 2.494 1.524 33.824 0.26 
Malaysia  -1.199**   0.003 0.483 -0.628 -1.247** -2.070 -0.679 38.529*   535.594 -0.091 -0.175* 145.221* 1600.117* 0.57 
Morocco -0.285***    0.011  -0.376 0.198   0.861*** -0.435 -0.387 0.381   -9.686 -0.004 0.022 -0.553 4.269 0.19 
Nigeria -0.292***   0.111  0.205 -0.037   0.800*** 0.072 0.228 0.719    2.855 0.009 -0.097 -0.528 -1.748 0.32 
Panama  -0.401***   0.009 -0.008 0.13 0.625*** 0.343 0.015 -0.823   -0.995 0.002 -0.003 0.099 -3.889 0.18 
Peru  -0.290***   -0.063 -0.563** 0.186** 0.943*** 1.205*** 0.513 -0.011   9.326** -0.016 0.038 -0.523*** 0.487 0.34 
Philippines -0.040   0.047 -0.008 -0.050 0.558*** -0.735 -0.531 0.168   1.776 0.008 -0.017 0.537** 0.339 0.25 
Poland  -0.291***   0.102 0.359 0.132 0.680** -0.585 -0.698 -0.492*   1.568 0.013 0.110* -0.518 -3.074 0.20 
Qatar  -0.841   0.340 0.424 0.517 0.826 2.965 1.252    -0.017 0.423 0.23 
Russia  -0.306***   -0.007 0.02 0.339* 1.129*** 1.008*** 0.502** 0.405  10.446** -0.044* 0.362 0.666 -11.083** 0.47 
S.  Africa  -0.849***   -0.202 -0.001 1.449** 0.824** -3.193** -1.779 3.154   -30.534 0.329** 8.721** -7.792 81.834 0.42 
S.  Korea  -0.457***   -0.189 -0.396 0.203 1.035*** 1.609** 0.330    -0.025 0.508 1.028* 2.202 0.54 
Turkey  -0.217**   0.190* -0.091 -0.09 0.476* 0.382 0.697* 0.321   -1.901 -0.034** -0.06 -0.078 -0.165 0.28 
Ukraine  -1.078***  -0.739*** -0.553** 0.905** 0.356 -0.652* -0.599** 24.319**   110.872 0.242 -8.173 17.891** 29.267 0.68 
Venezuela  -0.305**    -0.465**   -0.11   -0.011   0.826***   0.232   0.04   2.787**    -13.131*   -0.129**   0.105   0.753*   -0.357 0.26 
a The dependent variable is the log first difference of EMBI spread. All of the variables, except net foreign assets (NFA), are in logarithms. For each country, number of observations 
is one less than that given in Table 4. 
b *, **, *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
c The spread of US corporate bonds with BBB+ rating and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US Treasury bond yields 
d Institutional Investor rating   29  
 
Table 9  
Short-run determinants of EMBI spreads for a panel of 21 emerging countries (Monthly frequency, January 1998 - December 2004)
a 
                                   Coefficients
b               
   I  II  III IV V VI  VII  VIII 
Constant 0.198 0.253 0.323* 0.344** 0.325* 0.314* 0.297*** 0.454***
EMBI spread:       First lag  -0.029*** -0.053*** -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.043*** -0.082***
FED target rate:    First lag 0.016*** 0.013** -0.001 0.000 0.016*** 0.001
                           First difference  -0.067 -0.075* -0.054 -0.064 -0.093** -0.082*
US Treasury 2-year bond yield: First lag  0.003
                           First difference  -0.084**
US Treasury 10-year bond yield: First lag  0.011
                           First difference  -0.183**
US corporate bond spread
c:
 First lag  -0.020 -0.004 0.020 0.017 0.014 0.017 -0.009 0.026
                           First difference  0.687*** 0.692*** 0.690*** 0.697*** 0.641*** 0.620*** 0.689*** 0.684***
Fiscal balance / GDP: First lag  -0.003
                           First difference  0.011
Total public debt / GDP: First lag 0.041** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.097***
                           First difference  0.777*** 0.634*** 0.613** 0.647*** 0.666*** 0.634**
Net foreign assets / GDP: First lag -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
                           First difference  -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.021**
Exports / GDP:     First lag  -0.065*** -0.061** -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.066**
                           First difference  -0.056 -0.047 -0.065 -0.074 0.047
Institutional Investor rating: First lag -0.009 -0.022 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.006
                           First difference  -0.102 -0.063 -0.046 -0.050 -0.056 -0.069
S&P rating:          First lag          -0.026** -0.022
                           First difference          -0.298*** -0.261***
Number of countries  21 19 19 18 19 19 20 18
Number of observations  1406 1341 1329 1286 1329 1329 1289 1212
Adjusted R
2 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20
a The dependent variable is the log first difference of EMBI spread. All of the explanatory variables, except net foreign asset, are in logarithms. Unbalanced panel. 
b *, **, *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
c The spread of US corporate bonds with a BBB+ rating and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US Treasury bond yields.  30  
 
3.3.  Impact of the Fed announcements on spreads  
We now turn to the effects of the announcements of the Fed in the January 1998 – 
December 2004 period. Table 10 documents whether there is a change in the mean and 
variance of the spread of each country around each FOMC statement. Our null hypothesis is 
that pre- and post-event means (or variances) are equal. The window lengths are two, five 
and ten days. For the most narrow window length, the rejection rates of the null hypothesis 
are very low. This value increases once wider windows are used. However, using wider 
windows has the risk of masking the effects of the announcements due to the possible impact 
of other determinants of spreads. Nevertheless, for a five-day window, the rejection rates are 
less than 50 percent in almost half of the countries. For variances, these values are much 
lower. The estimation results of Eq. (3), which are presented in Table 11, show that the 
“target factor” and “path factor” defined in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) do not have a significant 
impact on the EMBI spreads. 
Based on these results we can conclude that the FOMC announcements did not have 
an immediate and remarkable effect on spreads in the period analyzed. Note that this result is 
in contradiction with the findings of Gürkaynak et al. (2005) for the US.  31  
 
Table 10  
Results of event study (Events are the FOMC's announcements between January 1998 and December 2004)
a 
   2-day window      5-day window     10-day window 
  No. of   Mean test  No. of Variance test    No. of   Mean test  No. of  Variance test    No. of   Mean test  No. of Variance test 
Countries   events  Rej. rate (%)b events Rej. rate (%)c    events Rej. rate (%) events  Rej. rate (%)     events Rej. rate (%) events Rej. rate (%) 
Argentina  60 23.3 57  1.8    60 60.0 60 25.0   56 67.9 56 44.6 
Brazil  60 11.7 58  1.7    60 60.0 60  8.3    56 67.9 56 30.4 
Bulgaria  60 15.0 55  0    60 50.0 60 21.7   56 67.9 56 37.5 
Colombia  48 10.4 45  4.4    48 54.2 48 16.7   44 70.5 44 31.8 
Ecuador 60  16.7  60  3.3    60  68.3 60 16.7   56 75.0 56 32.1 
Egypt  21 33.3 19  0    21 38.1 21  4.8    21 61.9 21 23.8 
Mexico 60  20.0  56  3.6    60  53.3 60 13.3   56 73.2 56 28.6 
Malaysia 21  19.0  12  0    23  43.5 21 38.1   23 65.2 23 47.8 
Morocco  59 18.6 45  0    60 61.7 60 28.3   56 71.4 56 37.5 
Nigeria 60  20.0  60  6.7    60  43.3 60 13.3   56 51.8 56 35.7 
Panama 60  11.7  57  1.8    60  50.0 60 16.7   56 60.7 56 23.2 
Peru  60 23.3 58  0    60 68.3 60 13.3   56 69.6 56 21.4 
Philippines 53 24.5 47  0    53 47.2 53 18.9   49 63.3 49 28.6 
Poland 60 13.3 57  0    60 40.0 60 13.3   56 73.2 56 21.4 
Qatar  11 18.2 10  0    10 40.0 10 20.0   10 50.0 10 40.0 
Russia 60 18.3 58  0    60 50.0 60 11.7   56 67.9 56 37.5 
S.  Africa  21  9.5  18  0    22 27.3 22  9.1    21 66.7 21 28.6 
S.  Korea  38  2.6  35  2.9    38 52.6 38 13.2   34 73.5 34 38.2 
Turkey 47 14.9 44  0    47 48.9 47 21.3   43 72.1 43 34.9 
Ukraine  29 20.7 27  7.4    29 55.2 29 17.2   26 57.7 26 34.6 
Venezuela  60 10.0 58  1.7     60 48.3 60 11.7     56 76.8 56 35.7 
a FOMC denotes the Federal Open Market Committee. Events are taken from Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005). 
b H0: Pre- and post-event means are equal. 
c H0: Pre- and post-event variances are equal. 
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Table 11  
Impact of the FOMC's actions and announcements on the change in EMBI spreads (January 1998 and December 2004)
a 
         1-day window     5-day window 
  No. of     Target   Path      Target   Path   
Countries   events
b    factor
c factor
d Adjusted  R
2     factor  factor  Adjusted R
2 
Argentina 59    -0.177  -0.225  0.00    -3.50**  1.665  0.05 
Brazil  59   -0.131  0.070  0.00   -0.261  2.181**  0.10 
Bulgaria 59    0.222**  0.002  0.02    0.439  0.435  0.01 
Colombia  47   -0.234  -0.328**  0.19   -0.247  0.609**  0.08 
Ecuador 59    -0.263  -0.422 0.01    0.110 1.866 0.03 
Egypt 21    -0.848  -0.454***  0.38    -1.302**  -0.143  0.10 
Mexico 59    -0.097  -0.052  0.02    0.466  0.580  0.03 
Malaysia 23    0.046  -0.049 0.10    -0.027  0.013 0.00 
Morocco  59   0.127  -0.144  0.02   0.035  0.668  0.02 
Nigeria 59    -0.777  -1.677* 0.12    -0.446 2.319  0.03 
Panama 59    0.031  -0.126**  0.04   -0.140  0.449*  0.05 
Peru 59    0.140  -0.030  0.01    -0.730  1.321***  0.15 
Philippines 52    -0.038  -0.267*** 0.14    -0.325  0.201  0.03 
Poland 59    -0.168*  -0.170**  0.23    0.089  0.191  0.02 
Qatar 11    -0.055  -0.266***  0.52   -0.062  -0.108  0.03 
Russia  59   4.478  0.081  0.07   5.585  0.991  0.04 
S. Africa  22    -0.406***  -0.374*** 0.41    0.563  0.112  0.03 
S. Korea  37    -0.209*  0.028  0.06    0.584  0.402  0.06 
Turkey  46   0.077  -0.169  0.01   0.177  0.759**  0.04 
Ukraine  28   -1.531  -0.327  0.11   -1.762  0.828  0.10 
Venezuela  59    0.092 0.065  0.00    -0.316  1.215* 0.02 
Panel  results:                
 Number of countries      =   21    0.169  -0.219*  0.04    0.093  0.921***  0.03 
 Number of observations = 994                         
a FOMC denotes the Federal Open Market Committee. Events are taken from Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005). The dependent variable is the change in EMBI spreads between 
the pre- and post-event. 
b Events are the FOMC's announcements 
c Target factor refers to current federal funds rate target 
d Path factor refers to future path of policy 
e *, **, *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  33  
 
4.  Political developments and spreads: evidence from Turkey 
Models built on the Barro and Gordon (1983) framework show that when inherited 
public debt is very high, the time inconsistency of optimal policy can generate multiple 
equilibria. In such models, a shift in market sentiment can push an economy to a bad 
equilibrium even if there is no deterioration in fundamentals. This occurs because the costs 
of honoring public debt depend on private agents’ expectations about future policy (Calvo 
(1988), Sachs et al. (1996)). 
In mid-May 2001, just three months after the February crisis, Turkey started to 
implement a new program. The banking sector was in turmoil, calling for immediate action. 
The rescue program increased the public debt-to-GDP ratio sharply. Other main pillars of the 
May 2001 program were macroeconomic discipline and an ambitious agenda for structural 
reforms. The program was supported by large IMF and World Bank credits. 
Although the stabilization program and the accompanying structural reforms 
imposed macroeconomic discipline, reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio to manageable levels 
required a considerable time period. In the meantime, a highly indebted economy is 
vulnerable to changes in market sentiment. Any development that increases concerns about 
the viability of fiscal discipline has the potential to move the economy into a bad 
equilibrium. One candidate is domestic politics. Note that IMF backed programs have a 
“checklist” –a detailed timetable of policy actions not only with regard to fiscal and 
monetary policies, but also in reforming the economy. A public debate about this checklist 
among members of the cabinet may trigger a political shock and increase concerns about 
debt sustainability. External shocks such as the war in Iraq can trigger similar effects.  34  
 
Another candidate is developments in the EU accession process since the EU process has 
been seen as an anchor to keep structural reforms and macroeconomic discipline on the right 
track. 
Based on these considerations we analyzed the impact of news regarding political 
discussions on the implemented program, the IMF and the EU on Turkish spreads in the 
post-crisis period.
4 In addition to international risk variables and domestic variables used in 
the estimation of Eq. (2), three additional variables are used: aggregated good and bad news 
dummies and real public domestic debt stock. The frequency of the data is daily and the 
period covered is May 16, 2001 – December 31, 2004 (a total of 906 observations).
5 
The estimation results are given in Table 12. Unlike the results documented in the 
preceding section, international factors are estimated to be insignificant. The Fed target rate 
is neither correctly signed nor significant, while the change in risk appetite of foreign 
investors (as measured by the US corporate bond spread) is correctly signed but 
insignificant.  
As the domestic factor, the sovereign ratings of Turkey seem to be an important 
determinant of spreads. To a certain extent, changes in real public domestic debt stock had 
an impact on spreads in the period analyzed. Note that such variables are indicators of the 
current stance of macroeconomic policies. As discussed above, more important for investors 
are whether the current stance of macroeconomic policy is going to change and the direction 
of such a change. The news variables that we have considered in this study can be used to 
find an answer to this question. Our estimation results show that news variables are always  35  
 
highly significant (at a level of one percent) and correctly signed. This shows the important 
impact of news releases, which give an idea of the intentions of policymakers on spreads. 
Table 12 
Impact of political developments on the Turkish component of the EMBI spreads 
(May 16, 2001 - December 31, 2004)
a 
      Coefficients
b 
     I  II  III  IV  V   VI    VII 
Constant   0.069 0.014 0.163** 0.050 0.345**   0.355**  0.359***
First lag of EMBI spread    -0.007* -0.006 -0.015** -0.006* -0.018***  -0.018***  -0.018***
FED target rate          
    First lag    -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.001      
    First difference    -0.027 -0.028 -0.025 -0.027 -0.024      
US Treasury 2-year bond yield          
    First lag        0.003  
    First difference       -0.203***  
US Treasury 10-year bond yield          
    First lag           0.006
    First difference           0.443***
US corporate bond spread
c          
    First lag    0.014 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.009    0.008   0.01
    First difference    0.024 0.023 0.018 0.024 0.023   0.01   0.007
Institutional Investor rating          
    First lag    0.006 0.002       
    First difference    0.101 0.096       
S&P rating          
    First lag    -0.036** -0.049**    -0.051**   -0.051**
    First difference    -0.104 0.114    -0.04   -0.085
Real public debt stock          
    First lag    -0.003 -0.002 -0.013    -0.013   -0.014*
    First difference    0.098* 0.097* 0.096    0.108*   0.105*
Good news dummy    -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.062***  -0.061***  -0.061***
Bad news dummy    0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070***   0.066***  0.067***
          
Number of observations    905 905 905 905 905    905   905
Adjusted R
2     0.17  0.17   0.17  0.17  0.18    0.23    0.24
a The dependent variable is the log first difference of EMBI spread. All of the explanatory variables are in logarithms. 
b *, **, *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
c The spread of US corporate bonds with BBB+ rating and a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US Treasury bond yields 




Using daily data from the end of December 1997 to the end of December 2004 for 
21 emerging countries, we have investigated the determinants of sovereign bond spreads. We 
have made a distinction between short and long-run determinants. Both individual country 
regressions and panel regressions are estimated. In order to compare our results with results 
given in the cited studies monthly data are used as well. 
The individual country long-run estimation results that use daily data show that the 
appetite for risk of international investors is the most important common determinant of 
spreads. This appetite is measured by the spread of US corporate bonds with a BBB+ rating 
with a maturity of 10 years over 10-year US treasuries. The usage of high frequency data 
limited our search for the impact of domestic macroeconomic variables. However, the 
sovereign ratings of countries are found to have a significant impact on spreads. The panel 
estimates (both daily and monthly) reinforced these results. In monthly panel estimates, total 
public debt, net foreign assets and total exports all as ratios to GDP are also found to be 
important determinants of spreads. When individual country regressions are estimated by 
monthly data, the risk appetite variable remained highly significant. For other variables, the 
evidence is mixed. 
Both for individual country and panel estimates and regardless of the frequency of 
the data, the contemporaneous change in the US corporate bond spread has an important 
effect on the short run fluctuations of the EMBI spread. The Fed target rate does not play an 
important role in the short-run evolution of spreads. Domestic macroeconomic variables  37  
 
have an important impact on the short-run behavior of spreads, as well. These results show 
that with the exception of the Fed target rate the short-run deriving forces of spreads are 
similar to the long-run derivers. 
In addition to the policy actions of the central banks of the developed world, their 
statements regarding their policies to be followed in the near future can affect spreads of the 
emerging markets. This possibility has been investigated using the statements of the Fed. We 
have shown that the statements of the Fed were not effective on the spreads of the emerging 
countries in our sample. 
Political news releases can provide information on the possible future actions of 
policy makers. We have researched the effects of such news releases on Turkish spreads in 
the post-crisis period. In addition to political news related to the ongoing program we have 
investigated the effects of the EU and IMF announcements. It is shown that both negative 
and positive news releases strongly affected Turkish spreads in the period analyzed. We 
think that this is an interesting avenue to be followed for future research for other emerging 











July 12, 2001  Bad  Political   66  MHP proposes to PM Ecevit to sack Economy Minister Derviş. 
September 13, 2001  Bad  Political   66  US and British aircraft attacking southern Iraq. 
September 14, 2001  Bad  Political   53  Congress authorizes use of "all necessary force".  
June 14, 2002  Bad  Political   50  DYP opposes moves to lift the death penalty. 
July 8, 2002  Bad  Political   103  Deputy PM Bahçeli calls for early elections. 
August 1, 2002  Good EU related -47  EU reforms to go before Turkish Parliament. 
August 2, 2002  Good EU related -37  Turkey moves closer to ending death penalty.  
September 10, 2002  Bad  Political   37  Deputy PM signals could pull out of government. 
November 5, 2002  Good  Political   -56  US congratulates Turkish party on victory. 
November 29, 2002 Good EU related -59  EU inching towards conditional date for Turkey. 
December 18, 2002  Bad  EU related 36  Turkey rejects EU decision to admit Cyprus in 2004 
January 7, 2003  Bad  IMF related 47  An IMF team is not expected to arrive in Turkey to complete the latest review, government has yet to take measures.
March 3, 2003  Bad  Political   72  Turk parliament rejects U.S. troop plan.  
March 17, 2003  Bad  Political   122  U.S. And Britain  tells nationals to leave Kuwait immediately.  
March 18, 2003  Good  Political   -84  U.S. has not ruled out Turkey aid, White House says.  
March 19, 2003  Bad  Political   120  White House tells public, Congress to prepare for war.  
March 20, 2003  Bad  Political   53  U.S.-led war on Iraq starts with raid on leaders. 
March 25, 2003  Good EU related -106  EU to propose doubling aid to Turkey. 
April 3, 2003  Good IMF related -61  IMF says to sign letter of intent with Turkey. 
July 14, 2003  Good IMF related -35  Low salary increase for high earning, high salary increase for low earning civil servants 
August 5, 2003  Good  Political   -38  Turkey sees no obstacle to U.S. loan guarantees. 
October 16, 2003  Good EU related -28  Cyprus says sees no bar to Turkish EU membership.  
November 20, 2003  Bad  Political   23  Two blasts hit north Istanbul.  
February 12, 2004  Good  Political   -21  İstanbul Approach/Bankruptcy Law amendment has been approved in the Parliament. 
April 21, 2004  Bad  EU related 19  EU "deplores" Turkey court decision on ex-MP.  
May 6, 2004  Bad  Political   47  Turk military raps government on educational reform. 
September 23, 2004 Good EU related -25  Verheugen says resolves row with Turkey on reforms.  
Source: Reuters.  39  
 
Endnotes 
1. More precisely, we use the EMBI
+. The EMBI+ is created by JP Morgan. It 
covers the external-currency debt markets. In the index, the US dollar and other 
external currency denominated Brady bonds, loans, Eurobonds, and local market 
instruments are included. See, for example, JPMorgan (2004).  
2. See, for example, Calvo et al. (1993) and Calvo (2002). 
3. Country specific data are sourced by IMF-IFS and World Bank-GDF database, if 
not available, then individual country’s central bank’s website. For the series not 
available on monthly basis, cubic spline interpolation methodology is used, as in 
Arora and Cerisola (2001). The database is available upon request. 
4. The list of news is given in the Appendix. 
5. Details regarding the composition of dummy variables are provided in the 
second section. 
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